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WAR AND CIVILIZATION.

R. M. MACIVER.

DOES an institution die when it has lost its meaning, when the conditions that made it intelligible or necessary have given place to conditions in which it is no longer intelligible? If it did, then to-day the institution of war would indeed be dead, the corpse of an institution with no animating breath. The process of the world has brought an age in which it is strictly and simply without meaning. The social conditions out of which war arose have been transformed into social conditions which leave no place for war. It were well if we could understand this transformation and so rid ourselves of the body of this dead thing.

To understand it we must understand how the significance of the 'state' has been gradually, almost imperceptibly, changing since first modern states arose on the ruins of mediæval empire. A process of social differentiation has been going on, the details of which have often been pointed out but the full meaning of which is almost wholly ignored. The result is that our political thinking is at many points archaic, and far behind our actual progress. Questions of great moment are coming up for settlement, arising naturally out of the new conditions, and we are discussing them in terms of the old. Our notions about the state are derived from a world where quite different conditions held, a world where the new questions could never have arisen because then a state was some-

thing quite different from what a state is now. We cannot answer the new questions until we understand the new conditions.

If we ask the average man who thinks or writes or talks about the state, "what then is the state?" he would be put to no little perplexity. "War," say the publicists, "is a relation between state and state." True, and there was a time when war had a very clear meaning as the hostile relation of states. At that time states were not only independent but separate, and separation makes hostility possible. At that time it was not merely states but communities that were separate and independent; and state and community were one. The state *was* the community. When the state went to war the community went to war. It was the people, the tribe, the city, the nation, and not merely the state that entered into war. But can we say to-day that the state is the people or the nation? Are the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the rest, states and nothing more? We speak as if they were and thereby show our blindness to one of the most remarkable and far-reaching movements of modern civilization. While we are thinking in terms of the old world, we have all the while been unwittingly building up a new world and a new civilization. And the new civilization is in one respect totally unlike any the world has seen before. It is so new that we do not yet understand it. When we do we shall see that the new civilization has made war unintelligible,—except as a survival.

I hope to show from two sides that to-day the state is not the same as the community or the society over which its legislation extends. On the one hand the life of the community is far too wide, complex, and spontaneous to be wholly included within the sphere of state-action; on the other the life of any community is part of the life of a far greater community. These are the two sides of a single development of civilization, which is transforming the character of the state, and in doing so is destroying the meaning of war.

To-day it is the state and not the community that goes to war, for there is no community which is separate and independent to-day. A war to-day between civilized peoples is essentially 'civil war,' because the peoples are all to-day *inter-civilized*. It is the breakdown of existing community and not the assumption of hostility *between* communities. That war should have meaning at all it is essential that the state should be co-extensive with the community, that a people should be as independent of any other people as a state is of any other state.

In the true military age this was the fact,—it was the fact for every civilization of the past. In the early civilization of the earth men generally lived in tribes, often on a very communistic plan, and the tribes lived in isolation from one another. The tribal system alone bound the members of the tribe together and in turn a man's place in the tribe determined his whole life. Within the tribe one essential sentiment of unity prevailed, the sense of tribal kinship, strictly confined to the circle of the tribe. Society was bounded by that narrow circumference for each. No community and no moral relation bound tribe and tribe. "The only place where the peoples could become acquainted with one another was the battlefield." (Eötvös.) That age of isolation was the heyday of war.

Even when the peoples grew civilized and the limits of community became larger, there was yet little intersocialization. Society and the political organization of society were not yet distinguished. When the state arose and took a definite name it claimed to sum up the whole of the social life within its borders. The state specially granted the right of intermarriage or commerce with members of other states, when such rights were not denied altogether. There was a religion prescribed by the state and a state-god, the God of the race, who was often also the God of War. The king or chief was the defender, with the political sword, of *the* faith, the faith of the people. On every side the state included the whole life

of the people and thereby isolated it from every other people. For a state must be independent and separate. It must have definite frontiers to which its law extends and no further. Its members must obey no other law than its own. Therefore when society and state are one, each community stands in isolation. The Jew had no dealings with the Samaritan. The stranger is the enemy,—the same word generally denoted both. In the Roman phrase a man is a wolf to a man he does not know. Each tribe or race felt that community was possible only when the member of another was adopted into its own, and took on its race and, often, religion. The unity of the tribe meant its severance from other tribes, because it depended on those things which separated it from other tribes, its race and its race-religion.

One form of early community deserves special notice in this respect, because it was the most advanced in civilization, and because its legacy of thought determines our thought to-day. Many of our political thinkers of to-day derive their doctrine not from the actual conditions of our civilization, but from the political theory of Athens. Yet in this matter the city-community of Greece belonged to the ancient world, belonged to a past civilization and not at all to ours. In the city-community of Greece men have indeed become citizens instead of tribesmen. The bond of community is widened,—it is now not common kin or common religion, it is common life, the life of the city, or rather of the citizen, for by no means all within the walls are distinguished as citizens. But citizenship here claims the whole life of man, as kinship did elsewhere. The limit of the city is still the limit of community. Socrates was accused of ‘introducing’ other Gods. “The city,” said Aristotle, “decides what sciences are to have place within the community, and what kind the individual citizen is to study, and to what extent.” In a word, state and society are one. Accordingly the life of the city, as of the tribe, is exclusive. The alien is either refused entrance altogether or is admitted on

suffrance, without legal standing, often only on payment of a special fee. He is admitted at most within the walls of the city, not within the circle of citizenship. The life of the city, as of the tribe, is exclusive. The sentiment of race or religion vainly stimulates occasional movements towards inter-community of city and city. No real unity is achieved, except for a moment in face of the barbarian. For the city was the state, so far as a state existed, *and where the political society is co-extensive with and equal to the whole social life of the community, that community is thereby essentially cut off from all others.* The result is the same in ancient Greece and in mediæval Germany and Italy,—the incessant warfare of independent city with independent city, only ending in their being all alike submerged in absolutism. The cities of Greece and Germany and Italy were like quarrelsome children, shut up at last, as they deserved to be, in the school of despotism.

By almost insensible steps men learn to pass from old into new worlds. The new civilization, our civilization, did not appear when the modern territorial states came into being. Each considerable country was still a separate society no less than an independent state. To be an Englishman was practically to be the enemy of the Frenchman. Nor was any true distinction drawn between political and other social forces. The state still claimed the whole control of society, not recognizing that it rests on and is itself an expression of the will of society. In France Louis XIV ordained that every Protestant must change his religion. In England the monarch or parliament once and again imposed political disabilities on those who did not believe the faith for the time-being established.

Yet slowly within the limits of each state a significant difference was revealed between the old and the new. The country state of modern Europe was the first large free state in the history of the world, the first large state whose political order was not imposed upon it. This

characteristic, itself due to the widening of the circle of realized community, made a new distinction inevitable: the distinction between society and state, between the whole complex of social forces working in a community and that definite organized political order we call the state. The modern state has during these centuries been slowly realizing its nature. It is only after centuries of strife and bloodshed that, for instance, states have ceased to impose upon their members a state-religion, and have come to admit in practice if not in principle that some aspects of social life are beyond their control.¹ Slowly the place and meaning of the state is becoming clear. The process is yet incomplete, nor can we prophesy the form of its consummation, though the ideal is that every social attribute, however extensive or however limited,—common race, common temperament, common speech, common culture, common religion, common humanity,—should find a society adequate to the degree and kind of community it involves. This is yet far distant, but meantime two lines of the social evolution, interdependent and very significant, have been revealed. For (1) within the state, with the growth of 'freedom' it has become manifest that society is more than the state and expresses itself in many forms and has a multitudinous spontaneous activity which is largely undetermined by the political order. It has become manifest that the state, the political organization, is created by a social will which manifests itself in other ways as well. Modern representative democracy is a recognition of the basis of the state on a social will that is more ultimate than and prior to the political will, to the 'sovereign' that it creates. (2) This social will is not only more ultimate, it extends further than the political will. It is not bounded by the frontiers of states. It extends as far as felt community extends, and need only cease where community ceases. Therefore it crosses the boundaries of states and unites the members

¹ In England up till 1829 a whole church,—the Roman Catholic,—was disqualified from political service.

of independent states in a single society. Let us remember that war is the breaking down of all community, and ask what right the state has to carry on warfare, *when, as is now the case, the state is not co-extensive with society.*

Men are beginning to see that there is something more ultimate even than the state, that the state is not the whole expression, or the widest expression of the common will of man, that it is one fundamental institution created by society, in a word, that society is greater than the state.

What then is society, and for what end does it maintain the state? Society exists wherever and in so far as human beings recognize any sort of community with one another and in any way organize themselves for the sake of common life or the furtherance of common ends. It includes an infinite variety of forms and infinite degrees of community. *No one form is all inclusive*, because none is sufficient for man's sociability. To meet one social need the church arises, to meet another the family, to meet another the city. Civilized life vibrates with social instinct. Beside the greater societies a myriad lesser ones are everywhere forming and reforming, dissolving and being created. Wherever men recognize a common interest, great or small, in religion or in the study of earth-worms, wherever they realize a common possession,—be it a land or an idea,—there a society springs into being. First the common interest, then the common will which it engenders, the will of the society whatever it be, directed to the maintaining and furthering of the common end. The greater our individuality, the more societies does it demand for its satisfaction.

The greater permanent societies stand for the great permanent ends, the societies of the state, the church, the family, the societies of production and exchange, the societies of learning and art. The state is *one among other societies*, fundamental, necessary, and the most authoritative, but neither alone fundamental nor alone

necessary. The unity of the social world is not to be found in the state, but in the social will on which the state rests and which does indeed lend the state a certain authority over the other societies.

It is on this matter that the current ways of thinking are misleading and confused. The source of this perplexity is easily pointed out. For, on the one hand, the state does by its law control other societies to a certain extent, does, and with justification, legislate for other societies, including even family and church; and on the other hand, we feel dimly that there are limits to this control, that these societies have a life of their own, spontaneous and free, not merely a part of the state life. We feel that when extreme socialists claim that these should be simply state-institutions, they are devitalizing these societies. A man is more than a citizen. Men do not worship God because they are citizens of England,—the God-of-the-nation day is past,—nor do they bring up families and earn their livelihoods for the sake of the state. The welfare of the state, for all its fundamental importance, is a totally inadequate ideal. The tribe was the small and single society of the tribesman, the city was the almost all-comprehensive social center of the Hellene, but for us the state is neither tribe nor city,—it has grown and differentiated in growing. For us history has been defining the place and the purpose of the state, and the process of its definition has been the record of our freedom. We have learned through centuries of strife that neither common race nor common faith nor common life is a necessary requisite of citizenship. A state, a political order, stands not for the whole of human life within its borders, but for a definite end or rather for all those ends which can be secured by established law and the central controlling organization that is primarily the executive of law. Here the state stands supreme. Whatever good enacted law can secure, it is the purpose of a state to secure: whatever a central organization backed by law can do, without hurting the spon-

taneity of social life, to secure any common good of its members, that it is the duty of the state to undertake. Each state seeks these things within its borders, and with the means at its command; beyond these it cannot go; beyond these the other social forces work out their ends.

In doing so these social forces have outpassed the boundaries of states. Society gaining freedom within the territorial state of the modern world passes also beyond its borders. For society has no frontiers, no limitations. It has only one condition, the recognition of common interest. It rests on the common will engendered by the knowledge of common good. The greatest social phenomenon of the present age is the expansion of society beyond the limits of any one state. It is perhaps the greatest distinction between the modern and the ancient world, but we have as yet failed to bring our political thought into accord with this development. Some of our accredited thinkers even speak as if we were still living in the little Greek city, whose life was rounded by the circle of its walls. Some still call the state, after Aristotle,² the "ethical whole" and say it "includes the entire hierarchy of institutions by which life is determined, from the family to the trade, from the trade to the Church and the University." It is less wonder if our popular writers often fail to distinguish, say, between the German state and the social world of Germany. The German state is, as every state must be, independent and self-complete. Its law reaches to a frontier and no further. In conferring German citizenship it rightly denies to its members the citizenship of any other state. But the social life of Germany is bound to ours by a thousand ties

² There was a better justification for Aristotle, because he spoke not of the 'state' at all, but of the 'city.' It was significant of Greek thought that the one word 'politikos' stood for 'civil,' 'political,' and 'social' all in one. Similarly is it not significant of the backwardness of *our* thinking that we have only the term 'citizen' to express membership both of a state and of a city?

of commerce and culture and ideal. Or rather there is a continuous social order in which German and Englishman meet, uncreated by government or political system, and eventually indissoluble by political power. Government can foster or retard it, but it is more ultimate than government, because society is greater than the state.

If we once realized how the civilized world is being transformed from separated, isolated, independent societies into a single continuous society, international questions would at once appear in a new light. We should see, *e. g.*, that the cessation of war does not depend on federations or treaties arbitrarily entered upon by independent self-sufficient states, not on the mere fiat of high contracting parties, not simply on the convenience of governments or the intrigues of diplomacy or the relations of monarchs, but on the silent widening social will that ultimately all governments must obey. The mass of society, the great working mass of every people, have an interest in peace and not in war. Their interests are one in every state; they form a single common interest. Common interest when recognized begets common will. It is on this common will that the world's peace is based. In particular the united peaceful industrial society of Europe, which has absolutely no desire for war and no interest except in so far as it pays for and suffers by war, is gradually feeling its unity and finding a voice. Some labor leaders have already threatened that in the event of war between western states, the labor parties would by striking so effectually intervene as to bring the war to an end. Such an attitude may seem a menace to the state, but we must meet the menace in the right way. Hitherto the state has protected, more or less, the societies within the area of its jurisdiction. It has acted, however, as if there were no continuous society reaching beyond its borders. This society the single state cannot of itself protect. What then shall protect this more universal society even against the single state?

The members of western states are already and are

becoming more and more members also of this greater society. This greater society is becoming conscious of its common interest and in turn will establish, through the coöperation of states, the means for its security. It has already begun to do so by 'international law' and by the recently established international courts. Many people regard 'international law' as law in name only, and international courts as courts in name only. What, they ask, is law that has no force behind it, or a court that can neither summon offenders nor execute its decrees? Is not law without power a shadow or phantom, and the tribunal entrusted with administering it but the vain pulpit of impotent idealists, pitting moral suasion against armed force? Such an objection is ill-founded. 'International law' is not yet law in the full sense of the term, but it is mere ignorance to say that therefore it is futile. You are perfectly at liberty to deny to it the right to the term 'law,' but you must admit its efficacy nevertheless. States do not sign Berlin treaties or agree to Hague or Geneva Conventions without meaning something by it. And there are many rules of international law that no civilized state would dream of violating. Would any civilized state to-day commence hostilities without declaration of war, or shoot down in warfare the ascertained bearers of a flag of truce? The 'law of nations,' which even Napoleon declared to be universally observed by civilized states, has been hitherto concerned more with regulating war than peace, but if it can regulate war, the denial of community, are there not a thousand reasons why it should be still more authoritative to regulate peace?

Force indeed of some kind the law must have. But whence in the first instance does the law acquire its force? From governments or judges or armies or policemen? Simply from the social will to uphold the law, the will to obey it. Without that will not a government or court of law could exist for an hour. It is that will that evokes the force that waits behind the law, to enforce the law

on any reluctant minority. Government is simply a medium of the will of society.

The assumption that law is only possible within a state is an unnecessary one. There was a time in the history of civilization when there were laws and no states, effective social laws. No legislature had ever enacted them, no chief had ordained them, but they ruled the tribes, were recognized and obeyed, upheld only by public opinion and the power of social approbation and disapprobation. So far as we can discern the dim beginnings of civilized life, first in the history of peoples came the law, never enacted or proclaimed, next the court, the jurisdiction, the 'doom,' revealing but not making law, and last of all the legislature took law into its charge. *International law is following exactly the same course.* The law itself has been growing into being from remote antiquity, the famed 'law of nations,' the "law which all men everywhere obey," dimly realized in the troubled political consciousness of the Greeks, interpreted by the Romans for the peoples within the Empire and after the pitiless wars of the middle ages first formulated by Grotius as a rule for independent states.

Here is the first stage, the slow revealing of the law. The second stage has now arrived. Two permanent international courts have now been called into being, the Hague permanent Court of Arbitration, founded 1899, and the Hague International Court of Appeal for naval prizes, recently established. This is the beginning of the jurisdiction that comes after the law. Lastly will come the international legislature, to take into its keeping, maintain, modify, and enlarge the international law. Why should not such a legislature be as authoritative as, say, a Federal Legislature? It is the fulfillment of the present process of the nations. It would leave the integrity of nations unimpaired, or rather ensure it, for it is war that has always threatened the independence of peoples. It is a means neither to imperialism nor to cosmopolitanism, two false extremes. It would maintain

the autonomy of states, as law maintains the liberty of individuals. And it would protect society. For while state is totally independent of state, and race, sometimes, clearly defined and separate from race, society is one, and links the nearest to the most remote and makes the most remote indispensable to the nearest. "I say, there is not a red Indian hunting by Lake Winnipeg can quarrel with his squaw, but the whole world must smart for it; will not the price of beaver rise?" If not sympathy or understanding, then at least commerce forms its nexus.

Even were they bound by this strong band alone, it would be enough to make war, the breaking down of community, disastrous both to the warring nations and to the neutral peoples with whom they form one society. This economic interdependence has recently been very strikingly illustrated by Mr. Norman Angell in his book "The Great Illusion." I do not think, however, that the new economic conditions alone are our greatest security against war. War has always been expensive and has rarely paid itself to the conquerors, but this has not prevented wars. The surer safeguard is the growing intercommunity of the nations, of which the economic interdependence is rather a sequel than a cause. It is isolation that sets the peoples to war. "They isolate themselves, expecting war," wrote Bastiat, "but isolation is itself the commencement of war." When nations are isolated, the strength of one is the weakness of the other, the pride of one is the disgrace of the other. When nations are inter-socialized, the weakness of one is the weakness of the other, but the wealth, culture, and progress of the one contribute to the wealth, culture, and progress of the other. For it is an elementary fact that within a society every gain of the part is a gain of the whole directly in proportion to the solidarity of the society.

The civilized world is becoming more and more rapidly an effective society. Each country is becoming more and more bound up in the welfare of each. Every recent advance of science has been a means for the widening of

the area of community, uniting men in ways impossible before. Railway, telegraph, telephone, Marconi apparatus, even camera, cinematograph, and electric theatre, are they not all bridging the gulfs of isolation, bringing the peoples nearer to one another, and enabling them to realize the common factors of all civilized life? The will for peace grows with the means of community.

It is solidarity that is making war unintelligible: the credit system merely makes it more disastrous. Isolation is the source of all hostility, the alleged causes are mainly pretexts. Nations have carried on schemes of mutual devastation in cases where no possible gain but only loss could accrue, in the interests of dynasties or in the name of religion or of honor. The first two causes, dynastic ambition and religion, need no longer be reckoned with. The world in which they operated, in which men fought and laid countries waste to raise a Habsburg to a throne or 'enforce' a dogma, is also of the unreturning past. Democracy has made the one and enlightenment the other impossible. There still remains 'honor,' and,—if we rule out the idea that commercial supremacy follows military power,—'honor' alone. 'Honor' stands out as the ostensible exception in international agreements. 'Honor' is the last stand of the argument for war. Nearly all the states of the civilized world have been in these days binding themselves by treaty to refer subjects of dispute to the Hague tribunal, but they have all added the words,—“Provided nevertheless that they do not affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the high contracting parties.” It is thought that the honor of a nation can be entrusted to no international tribunal. It was once thought that the honor of an individual could not be entrusted to the law of the land, and it has recently been pointed out, notably by Mr. Asquith and by President Taft, that the justification of war in the name of honor is the justification of the duel. The reasons which have led civilized men on the whole to reject the duel, the impossibility of vindicating honor by the accident

of superior swordmanship, the iniquity of a tribunal at which the innocent is as likely to suffer as the guilty, the wronged man as the wrong doer, apply equally to the international duel. They apply indeed with greater force. For indeed no civilized nation ever insults another. A statesman may, a newspaper editor may, an admiral may,—but a whole people,—never! And we are as grossly misled in identifying, say, the editor with ‘Germany’ and the admiral, say, with ‘Russia’ as ever Louis XIV was in identifying the state with himself. A people will readily be persuaded that it has suffered an insult, but it never regards itself as having first offered an insult. It never does. “I do not know the method,” said Burke, “of drawing up an indictment against a whole people.”

Is not to refuse to admit affairs of honor to tribunal the drawing up of an indictment against all other peoples? Would we not otherwise say with President Taft: “I do not see why questions of honor should not be submitted to tribunals composed of men of honor.” Perhaps the forthcoming agreement between the United States and Great Britain will be the beginning of the process that shall one day end in the destruction of the last plea for war, when governments recognize at last (in the words of the Hague commissioners) “the solidarity which unites the members of the society of civilized nations,” the solidarity which is the most striking contrast between our own and all previous civilizations.

There is another very significant aspect of the inter-socialization of the nations. Society, we said, was a question of degree. Within it there are groups united by many social ties, others united by few only. The members of a family are bound by the most numerous and the closest social ties; the members of a city have more than the members of a state; the citizens who are also members of a church, of a social order, of a club, of a council, have more ties than those who are not. It is the very nature of society to involve social groups and even strata. This is generally recognized, but what is

less observed is that the lines of social grouping and stratification tend less and less to conform to political and racial boundaries. There is the society of learning. Its members are of every race and tongue. There is 'society' in the sense of *le haut monde*, again international. There is the organization of labor, threatening even to bring internationalism into politics. Its members have in different countries the same political faith, and a faith not shared in by their fellow-citizens. So the member of the English labor party has even a political community with a German socialist which he has not with his fellow English citizen. And so with a thousand other groupings, artistic, scientific, financial, religious, industrial,—unions of men crossing the line of states. The educated Englishman has more in common with the educated Frenchman or German than he has with his uneducated fellow-countrymen. He is more 'at home,' more in society with him; he prefers his company. Lastly, do not our royal families, the ostensible heads of our states, intermarry with one another alone?

And yet we still talk of 'states' going to war. We talk of 'England's' going to war with 'Germany.' What, in the light of these facts, is 'England,' and what is 'Germany'? Is it the state, or the nation, or the part of society which happens to be divided from another part by the accident of geography, though united by the essentials of intercourse? Is not war between states intelligible only when state and society are one? Is not war unintelligible to-day? Is it not a survival from the time when state and society were one?

The new civilization has made war unintelligible,—it will some day make war impossible. But the unintelligible often has a long life, in politics at any rate. Meanwhile the burden of an inferior civilization retards the steps of its successor. The countless millions devoted to armament, which are least wasted when they are most wasted, could be applied to solving the problems of our day, the incessant problems arising out of man's struggle to make

nature serve his ends. So the question meets us,—by what means, while the peoples are yet only learning their solidarity, is it possible to set limits to the pace of expenditure for war? It is clear that no matter how unintelligible war may have become, no one of the rival states dare disarm alone. But this fact does not justify a *laissez-faire* attitude as it is often held to do. There is much that might advantageously be done while the world is only learning the conditions of its new civilization.

For instance, the following immediate steps seem obvious: (1) It is highly important to give to the Court of Arbitration and the Peace Conference, the representatives of the 'society of the nations,' the highest possible dignity, to appoint as members only men of the utmost distinction, and to make such appointment one of the greatest honors a state can bestow. The prestige of the court and of the conference will be in the present transitional stage the measure of its power, and the answer to those who still look on such courts and conferences as utopian.

(2) It is unlikely that the reduction of armaments can be effected by the resolutions of any court or conference. States cannot delegate such power even to their highest representatives. The immediate proper work of the court lies in a different direction. Why in especial should not the Hague Permanent Court take over the work of the Institute of International Law, and prepare an authoritative statement of the Law of Nations, such as all states might accept? This would be of the greatest possible service to the cause of peace. It would be the express declaration of the law of 'the society of civilized nations.' Once declared, the civilized states would in all probability bind themselves to observe it.

(3) Armaments will be reduced not by universal peace conferences, at first, at any rate, but by agreements between individual states. In all probability we shall very shortly see a treaty of arbitration in which the contracting states agree to refer *all* subjects of dispute to an

arbitral court. If two or more countries agree to submit all matters to arbitration, why should they not make practical use of their agreement? Does it not open the way to some such agreement as the following: "If either or any of the contracting states have a cause of dispute with some non-contracting state, and if, the former offering to refer the dispute to an international court, the non-contracting power reject the offer and have recourse to arms, then the other contracting state or states shall render armed assistance to the contracting state to which international justice has been refused, to the utmost of its power." Such an agreement would be the logical outcome of a thorough-going arbitration treaty, and it would for all defensive purposes put at the service of every state so contracting the armed force of all the states so contracting. It would thus render it possible for these states to reduce their individual armaments. It is very probable that were once such a treaty entered into by any two states, the advantages it brought would cause state after state to follow the example set. Some military powers might and probably would hold out, but the disadvantages of their position, however strong the states might be, are too obvious to need comment. They would be compelled to maintain enormous armies while every other state was reducing its military expenditure in some proportion to the effective united military strength of the contracting states.

(4) Why should not the small states disarm even now? The security of Switzerland, *e. g.*, cannot depend upon its miniature army, which is necessarily inadequate for warfare with the large surrounding states. Are not the small states protected by inter-social interests and by the mutual unwillingness of the large states that any one of their number should encroach on the smaller, far more than by arms? Is it because of their armies and navies that the international credit and the internal prosperity, measured in terms of wealth, of Holland, Belgium, and Denmark stand higher than that of big-armed Germany

or big-navied England? It is significant that Denmark, which has been foremost of the European states in proposing thorough-going treaties of arbitration, has already actually considered the possibility of disarmament.

These suggestions, haphazard and merely outlined, are here brought forward to show that, apart from any immediate universal action of civilized states it is possible for individual members of the 'Society of Civilized Nations' to take action towards securing the reduction of armaments and that greater internal prosperity which such reductions must produce.

If the argument we have stated holds, the new civilization, bringing to civilized peoples an ever-increasing and altogether new solidarity, is thereby making war more and more a meaningless survival. It is not our doing, we cannot help ourselves. We must accept the happier age, for the forces that are bringing it towards us are stronger than ourselves, stronger than our prejudice, stronger than our Nietzschean atavisms. Some, with eyes sealed to the movement of the age, still declare that war is 'God's test of Nations,' that he still "purges His floor with fire." Doubtless the battle is always to the strong,—to whom else should it be? But if to be most warlike is to be most tested, what people in Europe shall stand beside the Turk? And how shall the United States compare with Chile and Peru? Doubtless the strong nations will be victorious in war as in peace, but the strong nations have found other tests than war. Or, if you prefer it, God has found in place of war the tests of social and commercial progress. And for those who think it a bourgeois substitute,—well, there are still parts of the earth, among Pathans and Dyaks, and Fuegians, and the like, where the 'divine test' is even to-day in fullest operation, as it has been "since the making of the world." Meanwhile those who can read the signs of the times will rejoice that there is being prepared for the nations the healing way of peace, unmenaced by the blind catastrophe of war.

KING'S COLLEGE, ABERDEEN.

R. M. MACIVER.